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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS





                                           Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                                                                                                  Respondent
__________________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A78 643 739)
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Charles Honeyman 
__________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 27, 2009
Before:    RENDELL, GREENBERG and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: June 2, 2009)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
PER CURIAM
Khurram Jamil petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
decision dismissing his appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his
2applications for relief from removal.  We will deny the petition for review.
Jamil is a native and citizen of Pakistan.  He was admitted to the United States on
November 2, 2000, with authorization to stay until January 2, 2001.  Jamil had received a
visa based on a petition filed by his fiancee, Saira Imdad, a United States citizen.  In
2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued a notice to appear charging that
Jamil was subject to removal because he remained in the United States longer than
authorized.  Through counsel, Jamil conceded his removability and applied for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.
Jamil testified that his family arranged a marriage between himself and Imdad, and
that he married Imdad when he came to the United States.  Jamil and Imdad lived together
for eleven weeks.  Jamil stated that Imdad wanted him out of her life, and that, in
December 2000, they signed a separation agreement.  They divorced in March 2001. 
Jamil stated that he would not have agreed to divorce if they were in Pakistan because
divorce is unacceptable, and he would have faced strong consequences from family
members and risked his life.  Jamil submitted a news article about a woman who was shot
by her brother-in-law because she had asked for a divorce.  Jamil stated that the police do
not do anything to stop these “honor killings.”
Jamil further testified that, in 2004, Imdad contacted him and asked him to get
    Jamil stated that he is unable to adjust his status based on this marriage because his1
visa to enter the United States was based on his marriage to Imdad.
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back together.  Jamil, however, had since married another woman.   Jamil believed that1
Imdad had called him because her family was not happy that she was divorced, she was
scared, and she wanted the divorce to look like it was his fault.  Jamil stated that Imdad
had wanted the divorce and that she was the plaintiff in the divorce proceedings.
Jamil also testified that he did not leave the United States after his divorce from
Imdad because he wanted to finish his medical board exams, return to Pakistan as a
surgeon, and work in a hospital that employs United States-trained doctors.  Jamil stated
that he wanted to go back to Pakistan, but he began receiving threats in March 2004. 
Jamil explained that Imdad’s father told his father that he would make Jamil disappear. 
Jamil’s father also told him that members of the military went to his family’s home in
Pakistan and threatened him.  Jamil explained that Imdad comes from a military family. 
He believed that her family thought that he had initiated the divorce. 
Jamil further testified that his father told him that the military men came again in
August 2004 because they thought he was in Pakistan.  Jamil’s father told the men that
Jamil was in America, and the men said that they would make sure that Jamil did not
reappear, and that Jamil should make sure that he does not return to Pakistan.  Jamil’s
mother took a picture of the incident, which was provided to the court.  Jamil’s father told
Jamil that the men came a third time in November 2005 because they again had heard
    The Government had tried to impeach Jamil’s credibility with letters provided by2
Imdad stating that they had divorced because Jamil was impotent.  Jamil denied writing
one of the letters and submitted medical evidence to show that he was not impotent. 
Noting that Imdad did not attest to the purpose of the letters, the IJ concluded that the
letters did not compel an adverse credibility finding.
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reports that Jamil was in Pakistan.  The men told Jamil’s father that they would make sure
he never saw Jamil again.  A neighbor took pictures of the incident.  Jamil also testified
that his father received telephone calls threatening Jamil, and that his father had been
unable to collect his government pension.
The IJ found Jamil’s asylum application timely because it was filed within a
reasonable time of when he learned about his in-laws’ reaction to the divorce.  The IJ also
found Jamil’s testimony credible.    The IJ also noted that Jamil provided corroborating2
evidence of the facts to which he testified, including photographs and affidavits.  The IJ,
however, concluded that Jamil did not meet his burden of proof to provide documentary
evidence supporting his claim that men who obtain divorces are subject to honor killings
in Pakistan.  The IJ noted that the few documents Jamil submitted about honor killings
discussed the killing of women.  
The IJ further concluded that Jamil did not meet his burden of proof to show that
he had a well-founded fear of persecution based on his membership in a particular social
group.  Although Jamil claimed that he belonged to a social group of “individuals in
Pakistan who obtained divorces and then are subject to the wrath of the opposing spouse
family,” the IJ stated that Jamil sought to create a social group by the alleged underlying
5persecution.  The IJ stated that Jamil did not show that he was a member of any group,
and that there was no substantial, objective evidence showing that the practice of honor
killing extended to divorced men.  The IJ stated that Jamil’s fear was based on a personal
dispute, and that he had not shown that he was part of a particular social group or that the
men want to harm him on account of his membership in a particular social group.
The IJ also rejected Jamil’s claim of persecution on account of an imputed 
political opinion arising out of his refusal to comply with the societal anti-divorce
mentality, finding no evidence supporting such a claim.  Having concluded that Jamil did
not meet his burden of proof on his asylum claim, the IJ found that Jamil did not satisfy
the higher standard for withholding of removal.  The IJ also denied relief under the
Convention Against Torture, noting that the record did not establish that someone in
Jamil’s circumstances – a Pakistani man who divorced his wife – would more likely than
not be tortured if he returned to Pakistan.  Finally, the IJ denied Jamil’s request for
voluntary departure because he did not have a valid travel document.
The BIA dismissed Jamil’s appeal.  The BIA found no error in the IJ’s denial of
Jamil’s voluntary departure request and declined to remand the case for further
adjudication of this issue.  Although Jamil had stated that he could produce a passport, the
BIA was not convinced that the passport was previously unavailable.  The BIA noted that
the IJ gave Jamil additional time to obtain a travel document, and that Jamil was made
aware of the need for a passport to qualify for voluntary departure when his case began in
    The BIA also decided that Jamil’s evidence did not establish that it was more likely3
than not that he would be tortured by the Pakistani government, or that the government
would acquiesce to his torture.  This ruling is not at issue.
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2004. 
The BIA also agreed with the IJ that Jamil failed to meet his burden of establishing
his eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal.  The BIA agreed that the objective
evidence did not establish that Imdad’s family would kill Jamil to avenge the family
honor, and that Jamil’s fear was not on account of a protected ground under the
immigration statute.  The BIA rejected Jamil’s arguments that the IJ should have given
him notice about any problems with his documentary evidence, and that the IJ erred in
concluding that honor killings mainly involve women.  The BIA noted that the Country
Report on Human Rights Practices states that the victims of honor killings are generally
women.  The BIA also agreed that Jamil had described a personal dispute between
himself and his ex-wife’s family, rather than persecution because he was perceived as
having flouted Muslim or Pakistani views of marriage and culture.  This petition for
review followed.3
Jamil first argues that the BIA erred in declining to remand the case for further
adjudication of his request for voluntary departure.  The Government, however, correctly
argues that we lack jurisdiction to review a denial or a grant of a request for voluntary
departure.  See Obale v. Attorney General, 453 F.3d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that
8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f) expressly precludes our jurisdiction to review a denial or grant of a
    The Government asserts that we retain jurisdiction over questions of law and4
constitutional claims.  Because Jamil challenges the factual determinations surrounding
the denial of his voluntary departure request, we have not considered in this case our
jurisdiction over legal questions and constitutional claims related to voluntary departure
decisions.
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request for voluntary departure).   4
Jamil also disputes a statement by the IJ that much of his background evidence was
undated and from unknown sources.  He contends that, if the IJ had concerns about the
evidence, due process required that the IJ notify him of any problems during the
proceedings.  The BIA rejected this argument, finding no basis for concluding that Jamil
was treated unfairly and concluding that the IJ had assigned weight to Jamil’s evidence
based on its reliability.  The BIA noted that this is a common aspect of a judge’s job.  We
agree.  Moreover, Jamil has not addressed the substance of his background evidence or
explained how the evidence, if it was weighted differently, would support his claim that
divorced men are subject to honor killings.  Many of the articles that Jamil submitted
discuss human rights abuses in Pakistan but do not address honor killings.
Jamil also challenges the BIA’s conclusion that he did not satisfy his burden of
proof to establish a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a protected ground. 
Whether an asylum applicant has established a well-founded fear of persecution is a
factual determination reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.  Shardar v.
Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 2004).  Under the substantial evidence standard of
review, factual determinations will be upheld unless a reasonable factfinder would be
    Jamil has not developed in his brief a legal argument that he is a member of a5
“particular social group.”
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compelled to conclude to the contrary.  Id.  Jamil has not shown that he is a member of a
particular social group or that Imdad’s family seeks to harm him on account of his
membership in a particular social group.   As noted by the BIA, the Country Report5
reflects that women were often the victims of honor killings at the hands of their
husbands or male relatives.  In addition, there is no evidence demonstrating that Imdad’s
family seeks to harm Jamil on account of an imputed political opinion.  A reasonable
factfinder would not be compelled to conclude that Jamil has a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of a protected ground. 
Finally, we deny Jamil’s request that we remand this matter based on evidence that
became available after his hearing.  Jamil was required to move to reopen the proceedings
before the BIA if he wished to present new evidence.  We also deny Jamil’s request to
remand this matter so that he can pursue alternative forms of relief. 
 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.
